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ADDRESS
THE AMERICAN COURTS AS PUBLIC GOODS:
WHO SHOULD PAY THE COSTS OF
LITIGATION?*
Rex E. Lee**
The question that I am going to discuss with you deserves to be consid-
ered carefully, but skeptically. It should be considered carefully because it
affects two of society's most important problems: (1) the allocation of scarce
public resources, and (2) an overburdened court system. It should be con-
sidered skeptically because it calls into question something that is supported
by centuries of Anglo-American practice.
The question is this: Should the cost of running our nation's courts be
borne by those who use them, or by the taxpayers? Alternatively stated,
should the public continue to pay for what is used by only a few of its
members?
Fortunately, the issue is not a single, indivisible whole. For some kinds of
litigation, the only reason for not changing from public financing to user
financing is that the public has been paying the bills for centuries. Change
without delay in those easy cases is a good idea not only because it would
achieve immediate benefits of significant magnitude, but also because our
experience with those cases would provide useful understanding concerning
whether the change should be more extensive.
Both the easy cases and also the harder ones can be better evaluated
against the background of a brief review of the economic concept concerning
"public" or "social" goods. Public goods are generally defined as goods that
must be equally available for use by all of the public. A classic example is
the common pasture in the center of town, upon which cows belonging to all
citizens may freely graze. Another is the lighthouse. There is, however, a
difference between the two, and the difference illustrates the most serious
* This address was delivered as the Brendan F. Brown Lecture at the Columbus School
of Law, The Catholic University of America, on September 15, 1984.
** Solicitor General of the United States; B.A. 1960, Brigham Young University; J.D.
1963, University of Chicago.
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problem associated with public goods: overuse by free-riders. In the case of
the common pasture, there is nothing to prevent some citizens from grazing
so many of their cattle that they consume more than their aliquot share of
what is owned by the entire community. There is a potential free-rider prob-
lem whenever the public goods are consumable, that is, when the cost of
their use is proportionate to the extent of their use. This is not a problem
with the lighthouse, because the use of the light by one person does not make
a lesser quantity available for other users thereby "consuming" the light.
It is part of our American tradition that we treat our courts as public
goods. They are publicly funded, and made available "for free" to whom-
ever wants to use them. From the standpoint of the free-rider problem,
courts are more like the public pasture than the lighthouse. Their services
are consumable. Use by one has an effect on others' use. And since every-
one does not use the courts in direct proportion to the taxes he or she pays,
public financing makes it not only possible but inevitable that some will pay
for what others use.
While no definitive study has been done concerning the cost of this judi-
cial grass being grazed by other people's cows, one thing is beyond dispute:
it is not cheap. The most reliable estimates are that if all costs are taken into
account, the average cost of operating an American courtroom (including
the apportioned salaries of the judge and other court personnel, plus the
apportioned cost of the building) is somewhere in the neighborhood of $400-
$600 per hour. Does it really make sense to make something that valuable
available at public expense to anyone who wants it for as long as he wants it?
Clearly we would not provide at public expense a $5,000 a day hotel room
for as long as any citizen wanted to use it. It is equally clear that there are
differences between a hotel room and a courtroom. But are these differences
sufficient to justify the court-cost sudsidy in all cases?
The most obvious difference between a courtroom and a hotel room is that
courts, unlike hotels, are governmental institutions. Collectively, they con-
stitute one of the three separate branches of government. We assume that
their use benefits a broader segment of society than those who participate as
parties to the litigation.
Yet, in the case of the overwhelming majority of litigants, consumption of
judicial resources results not from any altruistic or public-spirited effort to
advance the common good. And there are certainly other instances in which
the public receives a benefit from private activity without providing a sub-
sidy in return. In any event, analysis will be aided by dividing the cases into
two groups: (1) those in which there is at least some theoretical possibility
that the underlying assumption of public benefit is applicable, and (2) those
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in which there is no conceivable rational basis for the way we do things.
Accordingly, I will begin by examining the basic case for change from public
financing to user financing of our nation's judicial resources, and then con-
sider those circumstances in which the case for change is less strong.
I. THE BASIC CASE FOR CHANGE
The easiest case is one in which the only result from the lawsuit will be a
transfer or non-transfer of money from the defendant to the plaintiff, either
of whom could easily afford to pay the court costs. The parties to such a
dispute have available to them several alternative means for its resolution.
One of these alternatives-litigation in a publicly-funded court--effectively
appropriates public money for the sole benefit of the parties. The fact that
they happen to be involved in a dispute that they have been otherwise unable
to resolve is irrelevant to their entitlement to a public subsidy. It may be
that judicial decision is the most effective and efficient means of resolving
their dispute. But it is a means that differs from others because it necessarily
involves an expenditure of public funds. Yet, we leave the decision whether
or not public funds will be spent for that purpose entirely in the hands of
nonpublic persons. They are the beneficiaries of their own decision and their
decision is driven by nonpublic considerations.
The genius of the free enterprise system generally is that it allocates soci-
ety's goods fairly because it allocates to those who are willing to pay for
them. Subsidies distort that process, and thereby deprive society of the bene-
fits of the free market system. The public financing of private litigation is a
good example. If the parties to a dispute elect to resolve it by negotiation,
arbitration or some other nonlitigation alternative, they bear the costs them-
selves. But if they choose to litigate, a substantial portion of those costs are
provided at public expense. We vest in those parties, therefore, an ex officio
authority to appropriate public money for their own benefit.
Why, for example, should the public subsidize a lawsuit between Grey-
hound and IBM, or between Litton Industries and AT&T? Surely others are
more in need of public welfare benefits. Yet, in each of those suits the public
paid the bill for thousands of hours of court time-at several hundred dol-
lars per hour-to determine which of these corporate giants owed the other
money.
More is at stake than just money. It is generally conceded that many, if
not most, American courts are overloaded. This is bad for several reasons,
not all of which are economic. First, there is a relationship between the
quality of justice and the promptness with which it can be delivered. Judi-
cial relief years after the event is seldom adequate. The parties' circum-
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stances have changed; sometimes the parties themselves are not the same;
and the linkage between the judicial judgment and the effects that it is in-
tended to have is usually weakened by time. A second, related negative ef-
fect is the cynicism that our citizens develop in the ability of our judicial
system to do justice. Finally, in addition to the impact of delays on quality,
there can also be a negative correlation between the amount of work that any
given judge is called upon to do, and the quality of his or her work product.
So if delay and overload in the courts are serious problems, why do we
subsidize them? Delay and overload are caused by too many people using
the courts. Inevitably, more people will use the courts-or anything else of
value-if they are free.
It might be argued that the use of the courts is not provided at public
expense alone, because there are other expenses (principally legal fees) that
constitute a barrier to litigation. The argument is correct, but not very rele-
vant. All that it proves is that the subsidy is not complete. But it is still a
subsidy; it is substantial in amount; and it therefore contributes to additional
use of a court system that is already overused.
There is a commendable effort currently underway to shift the resolution
of substantial portions of our nation's disputes away from the courts to other
processes, such as arbitration, mediation, or negotiation. It is an effort that
has received sustained attention from the leaders of our profession, including
the Chief Justice of the United States, and was given a major impetus by the
Pound Conference in 1976. Yet, at the same time that we pursue this effort
to encourage alternative dispute resolution processes, we effectively pay peo-
ple to do the very thing that we profess to be trying to find ways to avoid. It
makes no more sense than if government were to do something as absurd as
requiring health warnings to be printed on cigarette packages and advertis-
ing, while at the same time subsidizing the production of tobacco. If we are
really serious about encouraging alternative processes for the resolution of
disputes-as we should be-wouldn't it make much more sense to subsidize
those processes instead of their competitor?
Principally because of excessive litigation costs, some business executives
have attempted to resolve their disputes through "mini-trials," presided over
by "private judges," prominent lawyers who are willing to serve as "father
figures" in disputes between corporations. The principal inducement toward
the use of these mini-trials has been the litigation costs to the corporation.
This shift from public trials to more streamlined private hearings is the kind
of adjustment that an unsubsidized free enterprise system is capable of mak-
ing, and usually does make, with consequent benefits to society. Under our
present system, however, the market does not take all of the costs into ac-
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count. If corporations were required to bear not only their legal fees, but
also the public money that their decision to litigate appropriates for their
benefit, there would be even greater inducement to find more efficient alter-
natives to litigation.
Within recent years, several courts have imposed fines on lawyers for con-
duct that reaches so far beyond the vigorous representation of clients that
the legal process has been misused and the public injured. The concept is
sound, but its logical application reaches beyond attorney fines. More spe-
cifically, the fine is not the most appropriate remedy for the wrong that has
been committed. Consider the analogy to sanctions for violations of laws
prohibiting theft. Robbery, burglary, larceny, and embezzlement are and
should be treated as offenses against the public that carry criminal punish-
ments. But any particular theft does not spread its impact equally among all
members of the public. Restoring to the theft victim that which has been
lost should be a more important remedial objective than sending the thief to
jail or requiring him to pay money to the public rather than to his victim.
Similarly, though the attorney fine cases are headed in the right direction,
their shortcoming is that the punishment does not fit the crime. The real evil
of gross lawyer misconduct is that it consumes other people's money. If the
conduct occurs during discovery, the principal victim is the opposing client.
(The client of the offending lawyer may also be a victim, but this is an ac-
ceptable consequence, since he chose the lawyer.) If it occurs during the
trial or appeal, then public money is also consumed, so that a fine, which
goes into the public coffers, is appropriate. But the amount of the fine
should be measured by the thing consumed: the number of hours of wasted
courtroom time multiplied by the hourly cost of operating a courtroom.
The case for reform is perhaps most appealing in the context of suits be-
tween corporate giants where only money is at stake. If multi-billion dollar
companies need to use the courts for the purpose of deciding how much
money one of them owes the other, they are certainly entitled to do so. It
does not follow that they are entitled to have the public pay for it. And
though the case for reform may be more appealing in the context of the
corporate giants, it is certainly not limited to them. As a lawyer in private
practice, one of the first steps that I always took in deciding whether to
litigate was to multiply the likelihood of success (expressed as a percentage,
and representing my best lawyer's judgment) by the amount my client would
recover, if successful. Unless that figure was substantially in excess of the
estimated costs of litigation (or unless my client had other legitimate objec-
tives whose worth could not be evaluated in dollars and cents) I would rec-
ommend against filing a lawsuit.
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I think that approach is sound. I suspect that it is followed, in one way or
another, by most conscientious lawyers. It necessarily does not take into
account the costs that are borne by government, amounting to thousands of
dollars a day. Indeed, I can recall from my private practice experience sev-
eral instances when the dollar differences over which the parties were disput-
ing in a case that went to trial was probably less than the number of
courtroom hours consumed by that trial multiplied by five or six hundred
dollars. Those were costs that I never took into account. I would have if
they had been potential costs to my client.
For these reasons, I conclude that, at least in some cases, the costs of
courtroom services should be borne by those who use them. The harder
question is whether there should be any exceptions. Should the result be any
different, for example, where either indigent parties or noneconomic issues
are involved. Each of these possible exceptions turns on separate considera-
tions, and I will treat each separately.
II. AN EXCEPTION FOR THE INDIGENT?
The difference between free access to the courts by the poor and the
nonpoor may be more than a difference in degree. For a person or company
of means, utilization of the courts involves simply an economic decision
driven by net-worth-maximizing motives. That is, the decision will be con-
trolled by an assessment whether the litigant's net-worth will be greater or
less if he goes to litigation. For the poor, by contrast, the cost of litigation
would constitute an absolute barrier so that the indigent, unlike his or her
wealthy neighbor, could not make the same rational judgment whether to
litigate. And the barrier will of course be higher if it includes the cost of
running the court.
That argument deserves further consideration, but it may not prove suffi-
cient to carry the day. For many people-including many who would not
qualify under any traditional standard for measuring indigency-bearing the
total cost of a decision to go ahead with litigation would probably preclude
such a decision. It is not readily apparent, however, that what follows is that
society should respond by always picking up the tab. For obvious reasons,
the case for the public funding of courtroom costs for poor people is stronger
than for people of means. But is the issue really any different than the
broader questions of how public welfare dollars should be distributed and
how many of those dollars there should be? One of the strong competitors
for public funds both at the national and local levels is care for the poor.
The proper focus on the present issue may be this: Out of all the possible
candidates for the expenditure of public money to help the poor, how do
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court costs compare with the others? Starting from the premise that there is
a finite limit to the total amount of money to be expended for the benefit of
the poor, is it better to make access to courts easier than to make additional
money available for food, shelter, job training, or day care?
Perhaps we will ultimately conclude that it is unfair to make those com-
parisons; that legal services are sufficiently different that they should be in a
class by themselves. But that conclusion, if it is to be reached, should be a
conscious and deliberate one. The power to spend is one of the most potent
of all governmental prerogatives. The key to its proper exercise, I believe, is
that any spending decision should be the result of a considered governmental
choice, and not simple governmental inertia. It may well be that after care-
ful consideration, our nation's policymakers would conclude that there are
good reasons why the free use of our nation's courts by persons of limited
means is not comparable to other forms of subsidy, and should, therefore, be
governed by an all inclusive rule. But if that is to be the conclusion, it
should come after the debate rather than before it.
Let me give you an example of the kinds of considerations that ought to
enter into such a debate. The example focuses on the differences between the
way our society pays for two kinds of professional services, legal and medi-
cal. Doctors do their work in their offices and in hospitals. Medical care
costs consist of three basic components: doctors' fees, the costs of operating
doctors' offices, and the costs of operating hospitals. Lawyers do their work
in their offices and in court, and the costs for legal care also break down into
three components: legal fees, the costs of operating law offices, and the costs
of operating courtrooms. Thus, these two professions have three comparable
cost components. Yet of the six cost elements, only one is borne by the
public. Is there any good reason for a distinction that runs in either direc-
tion? That is, can any argument be advanced for publicly financing the cost
of the courts (one of the constituent elements of legal care) that is not
equally applicable to the other two elements of the total litigating cost? And
is there any good reason why we should provide a free place for lawyers to
work but not doctors?
It can be pointed out, of course, that we do in fact subsidize parts of medi-
cal care, including some hospital services. Through the Legal Services Cor-
poration we also subsidize for the poor elements of legal services other than
court costs. Each of these examples strengthens my central proposition that
subsidization of court costs should represent a conscious policy judgment.
The decisions to fund Medicare, Medicaid, and legal services programs did
not come about because these costs had been borne by the public for hun-
dreds of years. They represent deliberate choices by the policymaking bod-
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ies of government, following ample opportunity for consideration of all
aspects of the problem. If it is worthwhile to ask under what circumstances
the public should be paying for the cost of lawyers or the cost of the places
where doctors work, is it not equally worthwhile to ask the same questions
concerning the cost of the places where lawyers work?
III. AN EXCEPTION FOR PUBLIC INTEREST CASES?
I turn now to a second possible exception. It would be an exception for
noneconomic cases-cases seeking to vindicate a public value, or at least a
value that cannot be expressed in terms of money.
On its face, the argument is strong that there should be such an exception.
The American court is not just another governmental service, like a fire de-
partment, a park service, or a record keeping agency. Courts are the ulti-
mate authority on constitutional rights, but article III of the Constitution
provides that the power of the federal courts to decide constitutional issues
(or any other issues) is limited to the decision of actual "cases or controver-
sies." Similar limitations apply to most state courts. To the extent we make
access to the courts more expensive, therefore, we inhibit the development of
constitutional law. The same observation applies to nonconstitutional deci-
sions. Judicial interpretation of statutes that are important to large numbers
of people can be rendered only in the context of resolving cases or controver-
sies. Yet someone has to take the initiative and bear the expense of going
ahead with that kind of litigation. Even without paying court costs, plain-
tiffs often bear an expense-legal fees-for the benefit of the entire public. It
is they who are subsidizing the public, rather than vice versa. It would have
been an egregious error, for example, to increase the cost of litigating such
cases as Brown v. Board of Education.
These arguments are probably correct, and are probably sufficient to carry
the day. But once again, as with the indigency exception, I think they
should be exposed to the searchlight of skeptical examination. For while
nonmonetary suits frequently yield nonmonetary values to persons other
than the plaintiff and defendant, they are values that are not shared by all
who finance the litigation through their taxes. Any lawsuit is inimical to the
interests of one or more taxpayers. In the case of "public interest" lawsuits,
the number of beneficiaries is frequently large, but so is the number whose
interests the litigation impairs. As strong as the public interest is in vindicat-
ing a clean environment or strong civil rights laws, for example, it is not
always easy to ascertain which side in a particular lawsuit best achieves
those objectives, or whether the cost at which they are achieved makes the
suit a net contribution or detriment to the public interest. Would it be bet-
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ter, therefore, to leave the cost of vindicating "public" values to those seg-
ments of society who share a common view as to what those values are and
how best to pursue them? This would mean that the cost of public interest
litigation-including the cost of running the courts-should be borne (as the
legal fee component is currently borne) by organizations whose members
believe in the organizational objectives.
It could be argued that this is drawing the line too finely in attempting to
save taxpayers from financing causes with which they disagree. Perhaps,
this is no different from whether an individual should be permitted to with-
hold tax payments that he or she is otherwise obligated to pay, the amount
withheld being proportionate to the amount of the federal budget spent on
MX Missiles, aid to Nicaraguan rebels, legal services funding, or any other
expenditure with which the taxpayer disagrees. On the other hand, maybe
the public financing of litigation is different. This is one of those instances
where it really is feasible to separate the users from the nonusers by impos-
ing the cost of the service at the point of use.
Another potential problem is that even assuming the economic/
noneconomic distinction proves a sensible one, in theory it will not always be
easy as a practical matter to draw the distinction. A suit seeking damages
for breach of contract, or for collision between two ships, would seem clearly
to fall on one side of the line, and a school desegregration action on the
other. But what about the highly publicized dispute between the producers
of video equipment and tapes, and the holders of copyrights to movies and
television productions? On the one hand, it was a dispute over money, big
money. But did it involve more than just money? And were there public
impacts from the litigation beyond those of the parties? And what about
private antitrust or securities actions? They are economic lawsuits, but not
all seek a money judgment. And whether they do or not, they are brought to
enforce public interests based on public laws. Does the difficulty of drawing
any meaningful distinction between economic and noneconomic cases coun-
sel against the whole idea of changing to user-based financing of court costs?
I think not. First, if the distinction cannot be drawn, the conclusion may
be that users should pay regardless of the substance of their claim. Second,
while it is undoubtedly true that in a capitalistic society, most activity under-
taken for private gain yields some public benefit, it is an incidental benefit
whose magnitude is usually speculative. If it has any applicability at all in
the present context it should carry us no further than the proposition that we
should consider a general rule requiring users rather than the public to bear
the costs of operating the courts, but with exceptions in those individual
cases where the successful party can persuade the judge that the public
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benefitted sufficiently from that particular lawsuit to warrant the subsidy.
That is essentially the approach that we now follow in some cases by award-
ing attorneys fees to litigants who oppose the government and lose, but per-
form a public service by advancing the law in the opinion of the court.
IV. CONCLUSION
I will end where I began. These are hard problems, but they deserve to be
considered seriously. The fact that the waters are uncharted, and some of
them may be choppy, does not counsel that the voyage should not be at-
tempted. We should start with some points on which everyone ought to
agree-suits whose only issues involve how much money one well-financed
party owes another-and see what our experience with those cases teaches
us. Maybe our experience will show that the dichotomy between money
suits and others makes no sense, and society is best served by requiring that
all users of court facilities pay for what they take. Or maybe it will show
that the difficulties in distinguishing between the two are sufficient
enough--combined with other problems of user-based cost assessment-that
the whole idea should be scrapped. Or that the basic principle is sound, but
that the real problems are quite different from those that have been antici-
pated. What is not acceptable, I submit, is the facile assumption that the
problem is not worth consideration. Most of the important issues with
which our society deals involve hard choices and require positive effort.
This one is no different.
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